PUBLIC MEETING

Between U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 0350 Panel and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Meeting held on Tuesday, October 7, 2003, at 7:00 p.m. at Camp Perry, Clubhouse #600, Oak Harbor, Ohio, taken by me, Marlene S. Lewis, Stenotype Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio.

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PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT:

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John (Jack) Grobe, Chairman for 0350 Panel
Davis-Besse facility

Christine Lipa, Branch Chief, NRC, Region III

William Ruland, Vice Chairman, MC 0350 Panel

Monica Salter-Williams, Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse facility

Scott Thomas, Senior Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse facility

Jack Rutkowski, Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse facility

MS. LIPA: Okay, greetings! Welcome to this meeting that we're having for the public, and I'm Christine Lipa. I work for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I'm the Branch Chief in the Region III office near Chicago, and we had a business meeting with FirstEnergy at 2:00 today, from two to almost six, and the purpose of tonight's meeting is to give you a summary of what we discussed and then allow you all to come up and ask us questions or to provide comments to us.

Before I get started, I want to mention that there are copies of the October NRC newsletter in the foyer and also copies of FirstEnergy's slides, copies of the NRC slides that we used today, and then also a public meeting feedback form that you can fill out to give us feedback on how the meeting is going, and we're also having this meeting transcribed today by Marlene, so we'll all be sure to use the microphone, and when people come up, we want to make sure people speak clearly, state your name for the record and give us your questions.

What I'd like to do is start off with some introductions for the NRC folks that are up here at the table. At the far left is Monica Salter-Williams.

MS. SALTER-WILLIAMS: (Indicating).

MS. LIPA: Monica is a Resident Inspector at the Davis-Besse facility.

Next to Monica is Bill Ruland.

MR. RULAND: (Indicating).

MS. LIPA: Bill is a Senior Manager with the Agency, and he's also with the Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and he's the Vice Chairman of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel.

To my right is Jack Grobe. He's the Senior Manager in the Region III office, and he's the Chairman of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel.

Next to Jack is Scott Thomas. Scott is the Senior Resident Inspector at the Davis-Besse facility.

Next to Scott is Jack Rutkowski. He's the third Resident Inspector that we have here at Davis-Besse.

MR. RUTKOWSKI: (Indicating).

MS. LIPA: Also in the audience are some other NRC folks, we have Nancy Keller. She was greeting in the foyer, and she's the office secretary for the resident office.

We also have Viktoria Mitlyng --

MS. MITLYNG: (Indicating).

MS. LIPA: -- and she is in Public Affairs in Region III.

We also have Sam Collins. He's the Deputy Executive Director for our region in headquarters.

MR. COLLINS: (Indicating).

MS. LIPA: We have Jeff Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Jeff is the team leader for the Management and Human Performance Organizational Effectiveness Inspection.

And Randy Baker is a Reactor Engineer in the Region III office.

MR. BAKER: (Indicating).

MS. LIPA: I think that's it for NRC.

The first thing I'd like to do is have Jack Rutkowski provide a summary of what we talked about during the business meeting, and then, after that, we'll go right into comments and questions from the public. Thank you.

MR. RUTKOWSKI: Thank you, Christine. As Christine mentioned, we had a business meeting with FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company.

We mentioned that -- the NRC mentioned, Christine mentioned that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the licensee's progress on

implementing their Return to Service Plan, and also in doing that to inform the public of the NRC's Oversight Panel activities.

We had -- we did mention a -- provided a quick summary of the September 10th public meeting. During that meeting the topics discussed -- and a lot of it is already in -- is in the handout if you have it, plant response to the loss of transmission grid, plant status on the closure of technical issues, where they were on their Operational Readiness Assessment Plan, where they were on the Quality Assurance Oversight and actions that they needed to take to anchor long-term improvement.

Christine did mention that transcripts of that meeting will soon be ready on the NRC internal web site.

Significant activities since that September 10th public meeting was -- included the issuance of Integrated Inspection Report 03-017. There was a public meeting with FirstEnergy on Safety Culture on October 1st, 2003 and that the NRC had updated their Confirmatory Action Letter.

Continuing NRC Activities were Safely Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment Inspection, a Normal Operating Pressure (NOP) Inspection, which is

still ongoing, and continuing work on Restart Checklist items.

Upcoming NRC activities include a public meeting to discuss the results of the Corrective Action Team Inspection and then Safety Health Inspection. The System Health Inspection will be tomorrow at 9:30 a.m. at the Davis-Besse Administration Building. There is also an upcoming meeting on -- not yet scheduled at NRC headquarters to discuss the High Pressure Injection Pump Design Modifications, and we do have coming up inspections to look over the licensee's actions on their review of inaccurate and incomplete records that they had submitted. They will also have a restart readiness assessment team inspection that will be just prior to start-up and an inspection on the backlog of work activities.

With that, the licensee made presentations that were used to talk about where they were, some of the issues that had come up during this inspection period and since the last and to talk about their plans for future activities. Specifically, there was mention that there were personnel changes at the senior level, mentioned was that Joe Hagan was the new FENOC Senior Vice President overseeing

Engineering and Support Services, and that a plant manager, Barry Allen, had been named for Davis-Besse and will report to Mark Bezilla, Vice President -- Site Vice President.

The licensee also mentioned that in the recent normal operating pressure test that they had from their perspective fully met restart test plant objectives. Specifically mentioned was a very low leak rate, and that they also mentioned that they are presently assembling an assessment document which will be ready sometime next week and will be used as a basis to request restart from the NRC. It was mentioned that with the plant they have two Mode 4 approaches, that this -- the first Mode 4 which they recently accomplished would allow them to concentrate on paperwork in this outage and minimize the need for doing a lot of additional paperwork next outage. They also mentioned that during this last nuclear normal operating pressure test they looked at something like 1,300 components.

The licensee also mentioned that they had as part of their overall restart activities and preparations, they had brought in a strong management team both at the senior level and at the manager level.

They did mention Greg Dunn, who is their Manager of Outage Management and Work Control, gave a presentation on equipment challenges that they experienced during the recent full operating pressure test. It was characterized that the numerous challenges that exercised their problem solving ability. Specifically was mentioned a problem with containment spray pumps where they had some unexpected trips, and, eventually, they came to the conclusion that it was caused by a Solid State Trip Device, which is in their breakers. They said that they are -- they sent one of the devices out and it confirmed that it was the ground fault portion of that trip device. They have developed an engineering change, but have not yet reached a decision on whether to implement that change which would remove this trip from other similar devices, and they are still looking at the extent of condition; basically it occurred here, are there other places in the plant which needs to be looked at and evaluated. There were other examples that -- there were equipment challenges. There was a question on pressurizer heaters. It's still on their list to work, but basically has the same type of breaker that they have in their containment spray

pump.

Another issue that was mentioned was the Thermal Overload. They installed Thermal Overloads, but in that installation design change and subsequently there have been problems with some unexpected trips and unexpected cases where equipment did not trip where it should have based on the status of the Thermal Overload. It was characterized as an unintended consequence of the design change. There was a question on -- it was stated that apparently this was an issue with -- in the design, the design was not as good as it could have been, but it's still being evaluated.

There was also an issue with the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump that was mentioned in this one particular case they were doing a surveillance test. They call the equipment operable upon further investigation and trying to look at some words in their procedures. They wound up having to declare the pump inoperable in a short period of time later.

Another thing in the presentation by FirstEnergy was discussions about their walkdowns in containment and what they found at the normal operating pressure. They did mention that they did find about 163 items that ranged from not significant

to somewhat significant and looked at something like 1,342 components.

There was a question on a valve that has a small steam leak that apparently was missed in the first walkdown. A question of licensee replied that based on the NRC who had identified that leak, they did additional walkdowns and did find some additional components on the additional walkdowns. They weren't sure if they were missed or if they were caused by time and actually a small thermal cycle that had been imposed by a heat up and cool down. Those were the equipment challenges.

The licensee also had a presentation on some of the other challenges that they faced that fell more into the personnel procedure arena. The first one mentioned was a Core Flood Tank Valve. In this instance the Core Flood Valve had come open and had unintentionally or inadvertently pressurized the decay heat removal system. The licensee had looked at this and the causes that they came up with were procedure guidance, operator performance and training.

The next thing they mentioned was another challenge that occurred later and just recently, while coming down, cool down after the NOP -- after

the pressure test, they experienced a reactor trip. They had ~~root~~ group one rods, which are four rods pulled, and unexpectedly they hit a trip set point in those four rods moved into the core. The causes again were procedure guidance, operator performance and training, and also had mentioned that there were some incomplete job briefs. The questions that the NRC had on that were what was really the performance issue. There were questions on, yes, these were two separate events, but the causes appear to be the same and what is the collective significance, or is there a collective significance. The licensee did a report that they have a Collective Significance Evaluation which should be completed in the near future.

Also during the pressure test, the licensee reported that they had -- they had teams of managers and outside people, peers, industry peers, looking at their performance mostly in the control room. It was reported that peers from outside the Davis-Besse organization, people that are not FENOC employees, tend to be more critical of performance than Davis-Besse employees.

All right, also they mentioned that newer management appears to be more critical, and newer

management is basically -- a short time ago outside the FENOC operation or at least outside the Davis-Besse organization.

Also mentioned that at particular times the shift manager, who is the person on shift, who is responsible for keeping the big picture, sometimes had a tendency to get more involved in the action and might have lost some of the big picture, that was reported in their assessments.

It was also mentioned in these assessments there appear to exist differences in operational pre-job briefs and standards that are used outside with industry leaders in other plants.

Basically there were questions on how do all of these events tie together, how do all the assessments tie together. The licensee basically said that the performance that was experienced during these two events must be improved.

The NRC did have questions of when the ~~plant~~ plan would be in place and when we would see assessments on it.

The licensee also presented results from Quality Assurance Inspections which were also being done in parallel with the peer assessments and the managerial assessments in the control room, and

basically Quality Assurance confirmed comments that I just made before. The Quality Assurance results also had a statement that Emphasis on Control Room Activities and organizational response to ~~emergence~~ emergent issues. The comment they had was that collective significance could have benefit from other areas from looking at other areas such as training and some of the root causes, and then they took a look at some of the events that have occurred.

The licensee then concluded with talking about the remaining actions for restart, and they listed in there the hardware issues that are remaining which include Electrical Transient Analysis Program -- ETAP modification, high pressure injection pump modifications, repair to containment air coolers, electrical breaker coordination modification, and they needed to finish some air operated valve work, and then some of those were at the end of this month and extended into next month. The NRC questioned that there were dates for hardwares, but that there were questions on the soft issues, the performance issues, and what the licensee was going to do about it, and that concluded the basic public meeting. There was -- that concluded the public meeting.

MS. LIPA: Okay, well, thanks, Jack. I guess I would just like to highlight a couple things from my perspective that we discussed this afternoon. We talked about the normal operating pressure test, which was that the licensee went from a cold shutdown to normal operating pressure, held there for about eight or 10 days and then cooled back down to cold shutdown. During that time there were a couple of equipment issues and a couple of performance issues. We talked about those issues, and we talked about that in upcoming public meetings, we'd like to hear more about what the licensee plans to do, especially on performance issues. They have some evaluations planned to determine what the causes were. Once they determine those causes we want to hear what ~~the reactions~~ their actions are before restart.

A couple things I'd also like to point out in the newsletter, first of all, if I could get a show of hands, do we have enough newsletters? Did everybody get a copy out there? Anybody can let me know if they did not get a newsletter.

THEREUPON, the audience responded.

MS. LIPA: Okay, that sounds pretty good so far then.

In this newsletter, on the third page is the Davis-Besse Restart Checklist is where it starts in the middle of the page, and that's a listing of all of the items that need to be resolved before restart is even really discussed, and right now 18 of those 31 items are closed and the NRC has plans to evaluate each of these before the restart decision.

The other thing that's important on this newsletter is the back page has contact information and how you can reach our Public Affairs folks. It has phone numbers, E-mail addresses. It also has the Davis-Besse web site address on there, and there is a lot of other important documents on Davis-Besse.

Upcoming we have a public meeting on site tomorrow morning at 9:30. It's at the Davis-Besse Administration Building, and that's to talk about the recent health inspection that we've completed.

Also November 4th is our next monthly public meeting, and that will be held at the Oak Harbor High School, and there are some other public meetings we have coming up to discuss results of some other activities.

Also, as mentioned in the monthly newsletter, we have received thousands of letters from individuals expressing concerns to us, and we do plan

to read and respond to those letters.

That's about it that I had for highlights unless anybody else wants to add any comments.

(NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE).

MS. LIPA: What I'd like to do now is go into public questions and comments, and, like I mentioned before, come on up, state your name, we'll start with local members of the public first, state your name for the transcriber. There is also a sign-in sheet, and if you want us to get back to you annotate it on there with your phone number, and we'll try to hold everybody to five minutes so that we can get everybody in. There's a lot of people, but, go ahead, so if anybody has comments or questions for us, come on up.

MS. CABRAL: Hi, my name is Barb Cabral from Port Clinton, and my question has to do with procedures. In one discussion I had heard somebody mention that when it refers to that there was -- during the pressure testing one of the procedures that was being followed was the incorrect procedure. I don't know if you have any information on what that was about, and how it could be that they were following the wrong procedure, and also who is responsible for writing the procedures and making the

changes now that some of the equipment has been changed, and are all of these procedure rewrites finished and up-to-date at this point?

MS. LIPA: Those are good questions. I think Scott can probably answer the first one better than I can, and then I'll cover whatever else that Scott can't.

MR. THOMAS: Yeah, I don't think it was a question of not following the correct procedure. There were some procedure deficiencies that were recognized during the NOP test, so it wasn't a question of not having or following or using the correct procedure. It was there were some improvements that needed to be made to the existing procedures.

The second question, I think, had to do with who writes the procedures, was that --

MS. CABRAL: Uh huh.

MR. THOMAS: It depends on the type of procedures -- there is procedures for maintenance, engineering, operations. The -- I guess to make a short answer to your question, the licensee writes the procedures. Normally, if there are deficiencies determined or recognized during the performance of the procedures, then the Operations Department has a

process where they initiate a change for them and the procedures are upgraded or updated using that process, so -- was there a third question?

MS. LIPA: The third question was the equipment changes and updated procedures, and I think that has to do with the modification processes that the licensee changes or changes part of a system like a pump.

MR. THOMAS: Right, that would be kind of an inter-department question with input from engineering and operations, and then it gets back to what's the purpose of the procedure, is it to control an engineering process, a maintenance activity, to conduct operation of the plant. That would determine who writes it and who updates it and approves it.

MS. CABRAL: Does the NRC oversee any of that or no?

MR. THOMAS: As part of our inspection process, we look at the performance of the procedures as well as whether those procedures accurately perform or the acceptance criteria that's contained within the procedure is correct and adequate to ensure the operability of safety related systems, so in that aspect we do look at the procedures and how they implement them.

MS. CABRAL: Are these full-time employees that are writing these procedures or are these more of the -- because I know there is a lot of contract people that are working there. Are they hired out?

MR. GROBE: Let me just provide a little broader context, and make sure you understand. Is this working all right? Can you hear me?

MS. CABRAL: (Indicating).

MR. GROBE: Oftentimes people these days are using the words safety culture, and that embodies a whole bunch of attributes and how you operate or work in a group, but one of the most important attributes is that activities that are controlled in a careful, disciplined, methodical way that everything, before you do anything you think it through, plan how you are going to do it and you accomplish it in accordance with that plan. But consequently the NRC has requirements, that anything in the context of safety has to be specified in a procedure, and there are thousands and thousands of procedures on site, everything from starting a pump to the specific procedures we were talking about this afternoon are for fairly complicated procedures. One is called the start-up procedure. One is called

heat up, cool down and shutdown, and those are what are referred to as integrated operating procedures. They are fairly lengthy, maybe a couple hundred pages, and they're very involved. There's a lot of things that happen when you're taking a plant through those kinds of evolutions. These procedures exist today. They existed last year. They existed since the plant has started up, and they have been revised and modified and upgraded over the years. All of that is the responsibility of the utility to accomplish, but they are required to do it by NRC safety regulations, so even the smallest activity, testing a needle, which might be a three, four, five page procedure, is very detailed on the purpose, the requirements and precautions and every step that needs to be taken, and then the utility is required to follow that procedure, and if they can't follow the procedure for some reason, if the procedure is inadequate, they are required to stop and revise the procedure in a very methodical way to make sure it's right and then start the work again, so these activities are things that the Resident Inspectors look at every day, whether it's a testing activity or maintenance activity or operating activity, all of those are prescribed by procedures, and that's a big

part of their lives, watching the people at the plant do their work, making sure that the procedures are appropriate and adequate and that they're following the procedures and that they're accomplishing the work safely, so all of these activities are accomplished as far as the writing of the procedures and doing the work by FirstEnergy people and inspectors who are on site every day observing those activities.

MS. CABRAL: Thank you.

MR. RULAND: You also asked a question about who writes these procedures, some licensees choose to have their own employees. It could be the FENOC employees write them and some licensees also choose to have contractors do it and, frankly, while it's a licensee's responsibility overall to do it, basically it is their choice who actually does the revisions.

MS. LIPA: Thank you. Does anybody else have any questions or comments for us?

MS. LUEKE: Hi, I'm Donna Lueke, and I have one question and a statement.

The question was that when the reactor head was first discovered to have a problem, one of the things that FENOC told us was that they were going to

have a new improved system of portholes and cameras installed, and I believe that wasn't originally, they figured the timing frame would be about two years, it wasn't necessarily going to be installed before start-up.

Is that system installed now since we are coming on to almost two years?

MS. LIPA: I know for one of the things that I think you're referring to is the service structure on top of the vessel head, they put in access ports so that they can get in to take a better look at the nozzles through the top, those access ports are in.

The second thing you asked about was the cameras?

MS. LUEKE: Uh huh.

MS. LIPA: I don't believe there's any permanent cameras. I believe it's the portholes to allow the camera crawlers to go in and look around. Is that what you're talking about --

MS. LUEKE: Yeah. Are you satisfied at this point that that will give you much better access to seeing any problems that may develop like happened before that were not seen? In other words, are you confident that what the changes are

that they've made will allow you to see any problems that were not able to be seen before?

MR. GROBE: Yeah, Donna, there is no reason that the access ports shouldn't be adequate, but those inspections are going on right now as we speak. I believe the bottom head inspections should be complete. They were going on all day yesterday and today, and I believe the upper head inspections began sometime early today and that will be continuing, so our inspection and evaluation of the adequacy of those inspections is ongoing, but this same modification has been installed at every Babcocks and Wils -- excuse me, Babcock and Wilcox reactor in the United States, and Davis-Besse was the last one to install these portholes, and they have been effective at the other plants, so there is no reason to believe that they wouldn't work here also.

MS. LUEKE: And so they are here?

MR. GROBE: We will provide the results of our inspection when the inspection is done.

MS. LUEKE: Okay.

MR. GROBE: But -- and those are, like I said, those inspections are ongoing.

MS. LUEKE: They are ongoing right

now, so you don't know the answer?

Okay, and I have been asked to read a letter from the Kelleys Island Citizens Group because no one could be here tonight. They have written a letter to Mr. Berg and Mr. Caldwell.

On behalf of the Kelleys Island residents who have strong interests in surviving a nuclear accident at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant but are unable to attend evening meetings on the mainland due to the logistics and expense of ferryboat travel, we wish the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FirstEnergy to know that we strongly oppose the reactivation of nuclear power generation at Davis-Besse.

Over 150 Kelleys Island residents have already signed a petition opposing the reopening of Davis-Besse.

Kelleys Island is directly northeast of Davis-Besse by 16 miles. The prevailing southwest winds would blow radioactivity on us within minutes. No plan exists for evacuation of Kelleys Island inhabitants and visitors, nor is there any practical evacuation possible.

Because Lake Erie is the main tourist attraction in Ohio and visited by millions every year, the economic loss resulting from a nuclear

accident at Davis-Besse would be devastating to all of Northern Ohio. The injuries and resulting illnesses to all those contaminated in this population center would also be catastrophic.

We invite the Nuclear Regulatory Commission representatives to visit Kelleys Island to hear our concerns. And we also implore you to keep Davis-Besse closed from nuclear power generation. And it's respectfully submitted with the names, so I give a copy here.

MR. GROBE: Thank you very much. Just one comment in response to that letter. Where did you say Kelleys Island is? I've never been there. Is it 16 or 60 miles?

MS. LUEKE: 16.

MR. GROBE: 16. There's an emergency planning zone that does extend -- by the way, I have never heard of Ohio referred to as the mainland before.

MS. LUEKE: Yeah.

MR. GROBE: -- that extends roughly 10 miles in all directions, both over land and water, and that emergency planning zone is established based on the areas that may need to be evacuated in the event of a release of radioactivity

from the nuclear power plant. It's entirely possible that the utility has not engaged in an evacuation planning of Kelley's Island, but I'm certain that the County and State have emergency response plans for all areas of the County and the State, but, as far as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is concerned, the limited boundaries is 10 miles from the plant, and that's based on the need to protect the people in those areas in the aftermath of a nuclear accident if it should occur at the nuclear power plant. Thank you, Donna. Yes, sir.

MR. KING: My name is John King, and I work at Davis-Besse as a contractor, and, you know, we're talking about the control room, the other fellows working in there, and all these people in there to help these guys, well, I know of no set number of people being able to help these guys. You get so many people in there that because of distraction -- I was in there the other day doing a test myself, and I was a little pressured with all these people standing there. There's a lot of people in there just trying to help, but sometimes we go a little too far with all these people in there, and they're not helping. You're distracting, put a lot of pressure on these guys. These guys are doing a

really good job, but with a lot of pressure, lot of people, sometimes you get distracted, and I don't know if that was the cause of the problem or what it was, but I believe that really has to put extra pressure on them, and sometimes we fail in getting things right, and I think there should be some kind of a rule, a number of how many people can be in that room because it was packed. Thank you.

MS. LIPA: Did you say you were an operator or --

MR. KING: No, I'm a contractor. We were doing a test, and I was in there reading instrumentations.

MS. LIPA: Okay. Thank you.

MR. GROBE: You're talking about the control room?

MR. KING: In the control room itself, right.

MR. THOMAS: I guess the only comment I have with that is the operating crews that are in the control room are granted licenses by the NRC to operate the facility. It's incumbent upon them if they feel that the personnel in the control room are, in fact, a distraction. It's their responsibility to remove those individuals that

aren't part of the operating crew, remove them from the control room or ask them to leave, so I would say that that's the responsibility of the senior management on shift, operations management on shift, so --

MR. GROBE: Just one thing to add, we've had these folks, our Resident Inspectors, working very hard, and they have observed every major planned evolution that has occurred over the last several weeks, spent a great deal of time at the plant, and if our inspectors -- that's one of the issues that they are keenly focused on, if our inspectors feel that there were reasonable distractions at the plant, that would be a procedural violation. There's a conduct of operations procedure that talks to that specific issue, and they would certainly bring that to the attention of the plant management. It's good to have a lot of people observing activities and learning from things, but it's certainly not good to have distractions in the control room, and that's something we pay attention to and the utility also pays attention to, so I appreciate your comments, John.

MR. TSCHERNE: Thank you, my name is Larry Tscherne. I'm the business manager of IBEW

Local 245. We represent approximately 200 employees at Davis-Besse on the physical side. You know, over the duration of this whole time period here, I have had an opportunity to talk to a number of our members who are there day and night, and I guess I just wanted to come here tonight to let you know that the ownership, and I think that's a key word, the ownership that the employees have in that plant is second to none. You know, I understand there was a problem here last week. Every year we have the opportunity to attend a Nuclear Reactor Operator's conference within the IBEW. We take representatives from Davis-Besse to that meeting, and I'm here to tell you representatives that we take are second to none. I'm not ashamed to walk into a room with any of these guys. They're extremely professional. They're well trained, and they're ready to get going, and I mean that for all sides of the craft. Thank you.

MS. LIPA: Thank you.

THEREUPON, the audience applauded.

MS. LIPA: Anybody else have any comments or questions?

MR. DUNN: Brian Dunn. I'm with a citizens campaign, Ohio Citizen Action, and I'm

really here to state that citizens across Northern Ohio are really well informed of the problems at Davis-Besse, and while the plant's identified more problems over the 20 months that it's been off line, citizens across Northern Ohio sent 30,000 letters to FirstEnergy, both to Board members and to CEO Peter Berg, and these are handwritten letters. They are personal letters. They are from neighbors. They are from customers. They are even from shareholders, and FirstEnergy has not responded to one of these letters.

Because we have burdened FirstEnergy's leadership of failed respond, we request that as part of the public record the NRC note that these 30,000 letters have been sent, and we really wonder how many letters it takes to get a response. Is there any number that's recommended or, you know, a million or --

MR. GROBE: Brian, you're asking the wrong group of people here.

MR. DUNN: Sure, sure. Well, we noted that the NRC noted in their newsletters that there are going to be responses, so the real question is, I mean, is this the activity of a company that's concerned with public comment and response?

MR. GROBE: Again, I don't regulate their public relations department. We regulate the nuclear safety aspect of the plant. I'm gratified that the citizens, from your perception, are well informed. That's something we have been working very hard at. We've had some 65 public meetings in the last 19 or 20 months, and we will continue to meet regularly with the public and continue to have ~~forms~~ forums like this one to ensure as best we can that the citizens are well informed. We will be responding to the letters that we received. As I'm sure you can appreciate, that's a nontrivial task. We're reading every letter, and we're responding to those letters that we receive, so we appreciate the input that we've had from your organization.

MR. DUNN: Sure, great. Thank you. We have some more letters to deliver --

MR. GROBE: Okay.

MR. DUNN: -- as an example.

MS. LIPA: Are those for us or for FirstEnergy?

MS. BUCHANAN: These are for FirstEnergy. We've brought them here tonight to deliver to them.

MS. LIPA: Is there anyone else who has a comment or question for us?

MR. GREVE: Yes, I do.

MS. LIPA: Okay.

MR. GREVE: Hi. My name is Eric Greve. I've lived at various locations across Northern Ohio -- Bowling Green, Toledo, Akron and Cleveland, and along with Brian Dunn --

MR. GROBE: Could you raise the microphone just a little bit?

MR. GREVE: Sure. I'm a little bit taller than Brian. I'm -- along with Brian, here with Ohio Citizen Action, and I'm here to add to your not so trivial task. In the last month, 612 more citizens of Northern Ohio have written handwritten letters which I have here with me. In addition, 910 folks have added their name to a sign-on letter over the phone, both of those expressing their concern over the mismanagement here at Davis-Besse and urging the NRC to keep the plant off line, and then also again this is one of those things that is outside of your purview, but I just wanted to bring it to the NRC's attention that we are also going to be presenting some petitions to the County Commissioners of Cuyahoga, Lorain, Lake and Erie Counties, some

petitions. I can just read one to you, which states as residents of -- whichever county they live in -- we urge you to support a permanent shutdown of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant to protect public health and safety at Lake Erie. Again, just wanted to bring that to your attention of the interest in the citizens of Northern Ohio to keep the plant off line. Thank you.

MS. LIPA: Thank you.

MR. GROBE: Just an observation, we conduct these meetings in Ottawa County because it's the residents of Ottawa County that have a direct relationship with the operation of the plant, both positive and potentially negative, so I think Erie County is in the far northeastern corner of the State, isn't it?

MS. BUCHANAN: It's right next door.

UNIDENTIFIED: Right downwind.

MR. GROBE: Well, I appreciate the inquiry. Did you say you had some letters for us?

MR. GREVE: Yeah, I'll give to -- to you?

THE REPORTER: (Indicating).

MR. GROBE: Thank you very much.

MS. LIPA: Does anybody else have

any comments or questions for us?

MS. WEIR: Hi. I'm Shari Weir, and I have a question. I remember last spring that there was considerable discussion between the NRC and FirstEnergy about how the reactor would be inspected after the pressure test to determine if there were any leaks, and it's my recollection that FirstEnergy was saying they would do it visually, and that the NRC was making the point that a swipe test using a special tissue would be better for identifying minute traces of Lithium, and, now, you know, it looks as though the NRC is doing the same sort of thing that -- that it did back in 2001 when the NRC was pushing for FirstEnergy to close Davis-Besse and do the inspection, FirstEnergy was saying, oh, no, no, no, we don't have any problems, and the NRC let FirstEnergy keep the plant running six weeks as a compromise, and, now, again, it looks as though the NRC has yielded to FirstEnergy's wishes to just do the visual inspection, and then today FirstEnergy tells us, well, we -- we have this -- these new cameras, new technique not being used by any other nuclear plant in the United States, but given that they are a utility who can't operate the equipment that they have had for the last 20 some years, it

doesn't give us any confidence that they can, in fact, operate this and also makes us wonder if it's not happening anywhere else in the U.S., how's the NRC in terms of making sure that it works?

MR. RULAND: It was -- you had a number of questions imbedded in your long question, and if I could try to -- try to elicit from you to break this question up into pieces. I think one part of your question was, what is the NRC doing industry-wide for reactor -- for bottom head inspections. Is that one of your questions?

MS. WEIR: No, not really industry-wide, just with Davis-Besse.

MR. RULAND: If you recall, there was considerable discussion going back as far as at least November where the NRC had several meetings with FirstEnergy, public meetings where they submitted their findings, including their findings of any testing they did on the effectiveness of their NOP test.

In addition, the NRC staff continued to study not only what Davis-Besse was -- the findings of Davis-Besse, but the findings industry-wide, so, taking that whole picture, we then asked Davis-Besse to -- the FENOC management to send us a letter

describing the purpose of their normal operating pressure test with respect to bottom head leakage. In that response, they stated that while they were doing the normal operating pressure test, that test was confirmatory in nature, and they already believed, based on the characterization of what they found when they did the inspection of their bottom head, that the NOP test was only confirmatory in nature; meaning, it wasn't a requirement by the NRC to do that test. Our experts in headquarters examined the licensee's rationale, and completely understanding what the licensee could have done and what the evidence was that they had, we felt we were comfortable with the licensee's conclusion. We saw no basis to object to their conclusions that the test was only confirmatory, that they, in fact, that the indications underneath the reactor vessel head were not indicative of pressure boundary leakage under there, and that's what we concluded, but because we're continuing to look for problems in spite of the fact we thought the test was only confirmatory, both the licensee is doing their visual inspection that is consistent with what the industry is doing, we -- and they're sending a crawler underneath, which is over and above what our bulletins has asked licensees to

do, the NRC is continuing to inspect this area, so, that's kind of a long-winded answer to -- let me summarize, we're at this stage we're not objecting to the position that FirstEnergy is taking with regard to the -- their normal operating pressure test.

MR. GROBE: Let me add a little more to that, if I could. First off, I hope that you never expect us to not ask hard questions, and we ask very hard questions on essentially every topic we address with FirstEnergy. On a daily basis, this resident inspection staff is asking hard questions and you get an opportunity to see us a couple times a month in a public forum asking questions. Questions are not positions or decisions. They're just hard questions that need answers, and the specific question you're talking about concerned whether or not a Lithium wipe test was necessary in the bottom head. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, commonly referred to as ASMI, specifies what types of testing in pressure vessels need to occur, and we endorse those requirements, and after every outage when a reactor vessel is opened up and then reassembled, there's a requirement to do a pressure test, and that pressure test normally occurs for a period of roughly four to six hours, and the purpose

for the time in that test is to allow, if there is any leakage, to allow that leakage an opportunity to get through insulation and things of that nature and actually show up in a place that an individual could see it. FirstEnergy, because of the question that they had regarding a potential leak on the bottom head, as well as the new reactor head itself that they purchased from the Indo plant, committed to do a seven day pressure test, which is far beyond the ASMI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, codes, for pressure testing for the pressure vessels.

The questions that we asked concerned the likelihood of leakage and the best way to detect it, and after evaluating all of the evidence, including the chemical evidence, the visual evidence, it appeared to the experts in Washington that work at the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, as far as metallurgist to chemist that deal with these kinds of things day in and day out, that there was no reason to believe the bottom head nozzles were leaking, but the evidence was, in fact, that the material that was observed on the sides and bottom of the reactor vessel had come from up above, it was not coming from penetrations, so as Bill articulated, while there was no reason to argue with their conclusion, this is

simply a confirmatory test. It's a confirmatory test that is far beyond the requirements.

In addition to that, FirstEnergy did research that demonstrated that they could detect leakage down to one ten-thousandth of a gallon per minute and we -- they presented that to us in a public meeting. We discussed that. We evaluated their test methodology for how they showed what they could detect in seven days, and that's far below any threshold that other folks would be able to detect from the ASMI required test, so this test was an extremely conservative test far beyond our requirements, and our folks in Washington concluded that -- those that are experts in this area concluded that the questions that we were asking were adequately addressed through the test procedure that FirstEnergy adopted.

I think I heard you ask another question and that had to do with, I think, the FLUS Monitoring System; is that correct?

MS. WEIR: Uh huh.

MR. GROBE: The question I believe you asked was, since this is the only one of a kind, where does anybody have the expertise to evaluate it? Was that the question?

MS. WEIR: Yeah, basically the only one in America is what I understood.

MR. GROBE: The FLUS Monitoring System, FirstEnergy did take the initiative to be the first plant in the United States to install this type of monitoring system. It detects humidity inside the insulation but outside the reactor vessel in the region of the lower head of the reactor, and no other utility in the United States is currently using this technology. It's not required by us, and it's not likely going to be inspected by us because it's not part of the required safety systems, but it does provide additional data, and they took the opportunity of this normal operating pressure test to calibrate that system, and they indicated that they will be incorporating it into their normal monitoring processes, but it's not part of the NRC required technical specifications for the plant, and it's not going to be required as of right now at any other plant, so, again, this is beyond our requirements for reactor coolant system leakage, and it's interesting information that FirstEnergy has available to them that other nuclear plants do not have available to them.

MR. RULAND: One more thing, if I

could add, the licensee, FENOC, completed 80% of their inspections, I think, effective basically the beginning of this meeting, and identified no leakage.

MS. WEIR: Thank you. Tough questions are good. I think what we need at this plant are more than tough questions. Thank you.

MS. LIPA: Any other questions or comments for us? Yes.

MS. BUCHANAN: My name is Sandy Buchanan. I wanted to ask a couple questions about safety culture, but, first, even though I know you probably think you're spending too much time in Ohio, I guess we ought to invite NRC and your colleagues to spend more time here, as I do vacation in this area every summer and see what it would be like if there were an evacuation attempted in this area with the type of congestions; one lane roads, if something were to happen in the event of an accident, and, by the way, the Islands are not included in your evacuation plan, and we were told by one of the County officials that that's no problem because those people there are so resourceful, they'll figure out what to do. Now, at an October 2nd --

MR. GROBE: Is it true?

MS. BUCHANAN: Pardon me?

MR. GROBE: Is it true?

MS. BUCHANAN: I don't know, what are you going to do in the event of a nuclear accident, and you're on an Island?

MR. GROBE: No, I was asking whether the Kelleys Island people are resourceful.

The fact of the matter is, that the emergency planning zone is set at a distance that is appropriate for a hazard.

MS. BUCHANAN: Well, I think that's ridiculous. I think 16 -- if you could see the area, I think you would agree.

On October 2nd The Akron Beacon Journal reported that FirstEnergy says that in the fourth quarter of 2004 it will hire an independent safety culture expert to review the status of safety culture, and I guess one of my questions is, if we're going to wait -- if they're going to wait until the fourth quarter of 2004 to have an independent evaluation, and safety culture has been the crucial issue here, how is the NRC going to be able to decide whether to restart this plant without having seen this independent evaluation?

MR. GROBE: Let me take a shot at that.

MR. RULAND: All right.

MR. GROBE: Let me first comment that there have been times where it's not appropriate or convenient -- convenient is not the right word, efficient to conduct public meetings here in the Ottawa County area, and this meeting that you're referring to was conducted in Chicago for that very reason because we had a number of people from the Chicago office that needed to participate, so it was more cost effective for us to move FirstEnergy to Chicago than it was to move Chicago to FirstEnergy. When we do that, we offer the opportunity for the public to participate. I believe for this meeting we had a hundred toll free phone lines, which I hope you took advantage of. At one point I think we had over 70 lines occupied, and so that means 70 folks from across the United States took the opportunity to listen into that meeting. There's a number of activities assessing safety culture that are ongoing and will continue after restart. One of the outcomes of that meeting last Thursday, I guess --

MS. LIPA: Wednesday.

MR. GROBE: -- Wednesday, was there was additional information that is necessary for FirstEnergy around the particular area that

you're focusing on, but prior to restart, as you're well aware, there was an independent safety culture assessment as well as periodic internal safety culture assessments. The NRC, as a matter of fact, the fellow that's sitting right behind you, Jeff Wright, is the team leader of the inspection team, incidentally, with how FirstEnergy is conducting those assessments and evaluating or adding, but after restart, the licensee described their process for continuing to evaluate safety culture of the plant and it was a multi-pronged process.

First, there's going to be a monthly assessment that is going to be primarily those aspects of safety culture that are more easily measured -- numerically measured, evaluating things that are less, what I'll say soft, less -- the kind of image that you would need an industrial psychologist, for example, so those will be happening monthly, and they'll be reported to management, and we'll have access to that information, and then on an annual basis, the Quality Assurance Department which currently reports to the Corporate office of FirstEnergy, will no longer associated with the cellar association of Davis-Besse, will be doing an independent assessment and will be describing to us

as utilizing the same techniques and approaches that performance safety and health associates used, which is Dr. Haber's group, in February of this year, and that would be conducted on an annual basis.

In addition to that, once every 24 months FirstEnergy would utilize their comprehensive, on site independent -- excuse me, assessment technique. It's very similar to -- and it was described as being very similar to what they're using prior to restart to evaluate the safety culture, and, as you indicated, in the fourth quarter of 2004, they would then again bring a completely independent group of experts outside the organization to come back in and benchmark where they are, so there will be a continuous assessment with these monthly evaluations and the annual evaluations and biannual evaluations, which would then again be benchmarked in the fourth quarter of 2004, so it's a much more comprehensive now assessment approach than what you first described.

The difficulty we have is that the procedures and guidance for doing these various activities are not yet developed or shared with us, and FirstEnergy agreed to share that information with us as soon as it's available, as soon as it's ready, as soon as

they have completed these plans for these additional assessments.

MS. BUCHANAN: When FirstEnergy provided to this group in April a -- results of its internal survey on safety culture, there were some significant areas, double digits percentages where employees said they either had personally been harassed or intimidated for raising safety issues or had known themselves personally of instances where that happened.

I'm wondering if in your follow-up with FirstEnergy on this what has been done to investigate those incidents?

What happened to the management who was harassing, intimidating workers for raising safety culture, and how are you going to track that? That was a very serious finding.

MR. GROBE: Yeah, I think what you're referring to is what we call safety conscious work environment. You'll appreciate these terms --

MS. BUCHANAN: Yes, those are the terms from their exact survey.

MR. GROBE: Right. No, what I mean is the area of safety culture is very broad. One aspect of safety culture is the environment that

the utility establishes, which either can foster individuals being willing and able to raise safety issues or can disenfranchise people from the ability to raise safety issues. We call it safety conscious work environment where their work environment is appropriate to safety focus, whether folks are not only able to, but encouraged to raise any concerns or issues that they have. The survey that you're referring to was first conducted again in the early fall of last year. It was conducted in the spring of this year, and FirstEnergy committed it would conduct it again in November prior to restart to ensure that the activities that they have implemented to continue to address and improve in that area and, in fact, are causing improvement, so we'll be looking forward to the results of that survey, and that will certainly be shared publicly.

MS. BUCHANAN: Well, we're looking forward to seeing that because that's an area that's absolutely critical, as you said, to determine whether the facility is safe and whether the workers feel it's safe with the concerns.

MR. THOMAS: I just wanted to comment on the first thing you said when you stood up, that you invited us to spend more time in Ohio,

and I'd just like to point out that three of us have taken you up on your kind invitation, and three of the individuals up here live here permanently, so -- in a local area.

MR. GROBE: I grew up in Cleveland and I have many relatives that still live here, I'm here on a regular basis.

MS. BUCHANAN: I was referring to your questions about where these various counties were.

MR. GROBE: Yeah, and it surprises me that I didn't know where Erie County was.

MR. RULAND: And if I may add, for the record, the NRC and the O350 panel, specifically, has made no conclusions or rendered any judgment on the safety culture at Davis-Besse.

MR. GROBE: Thanks, Bill.

MR. RULAND: We haven't arrived at any conclusion, positive or negative, and it's still a matter of discussions and deliberations.

MR. GROBE: And when Jeff's team finishes their work and reports the results to the panel, and when the panel asks those tough questions of Jeff's team and until it's satisfactory, we'll certainly be presenting results of that inspection

publicly.

MS. LIPA: Okay. Anybody else have any questions for us, comments?

MS. KRAMER: My name is Jessica Kramer, and I was just wondering as you consider whether allowing Davis-Besse to go back on-line, are you using any information you already have about a major nuclear accident that actually did take place in 1979 at Three Mile Island?

MR. GROBE: Jessica, I'm not sure I understand your question. Let me take a try, and then if I haven't hit the mark, you go ahead and ask a follow-up question.

Following the accident at Three Mile Island, some of us were around then. There was a whole host of activities that the NRC engaged in to address the issues that were learned from that accident. It was sometimes referred to as the TMI reaction plan, and there were many new requirements that came out of that, and certainly those issues learned from Three Mile Island affected every nuclear power plant in the United States, including Davis-Besse. Have I answered your question?

MS. KRAMER: I just -- I have some photographs of plant mutation which neighbors have

been reporting are -- have been occurring really within a 10 mile radius, even beyond, for 25 years since the accident.

I would just like to -- could you deliver these to Mr. Caldwell for me?

MR. GROBE: Certainly.

MS. KRAMER: Thank you.

MR. ZYCHOWICZ: My name is Ray Zychowicz. I work at Davis-Besse. I have been at Davis-Besse since day one. I was part of the original start-up crew, and I have come to a number of these meetings and most of them have been positive, this one has taken kind of a negative tone, and I resent some of the comments that were made here today. The comment that we didn't know how to operate the equipment for the last 25 years, I need to remind the citizens in this room that for the last 25 years we supplied Northwestern Ohio with pollution-free electricity. We were amongst the top world performers in the '90s, and even in light of the latest thing with our head, we have never jeopardized public safety, and we will never jeopardize public safety.

I'm also the chief steward in the plant, and, over the years, I have had many discussions with

management and a lot of differences with management, but never did we ever argue over an issue that revolved around public safety.

Also I need to remind you that during the blizzard back in the '70s when every other industry in Northwest Ohio shut down, we kept our plant running. We helicoptered people in to keep the plant running and keep the place safe.

Also during the tornado in the '90s, we came back, we went on day and night coverage to bring the plant back to safe operation.

Also since this shutdown, we have been working day and night to bring this plant back in to operation to continue to supply Northwest Ohio with pollution-free electricity. Thank you.

THEREUPON, the audience applauded.

MR. GROBE: What's important to us -- this is certainly not a popularity contest, and the popular opinion is not the one that is important to us, it's every opinion that's important to us. We're here to receive comments from everybody, and receive and respect those from everybody, and I appreciate your comments, Ray. Yes, sir.

MR. PAPCUN: My name is John Papcun. I'm one of the Ottawa County Commissioners,

I live in this County, born and raised here, was the County Engineer for 32 years, retired, became Commissioner.

Just wanted to tell these people we've had our participation and our drills rated A-1 for the last 25 years. A lot of volunteers do this in our County. I don't know if they do it in their counties or not. I think it's time to move on. I believe the great majority of the people in Ottawa County where the plant is located want the plant to restart, we need the jobs, we need the power; however, I'm also -- have all the faith in the world that the NRC will not let that happen until it can be done in a safe, reliable manner. We have 103 nuclear power plants, I believe, and I would like to ask the people that signed those petitions if they would also sign an affidavit and be the first volunteers if the plants in the United States that produced a safe, reliable power and clean power would sign the affidavit to be the first volunteers to do away with their air conditioning systems, their washing machines, their dishwashers, their TV's, their microwaves and so forth because you can't store electricity, at least my engineering background tells me you can't store it. We don't have batteries big

enough to store the power of the United States, and you think that last brownout was something, shut some more plants down and you haven't seen the beginning of it, so I'm just here to tell you that on behalf of the County officials and the people in Ottawa County, we need a safe, reliable restart of this plant. We need the jobs. We need the power, and I do have one favor, though. I believe that the next panel meetings are slated for election night, and wondered if it's possible that they could be changed because our volunteers that work the polls work from 6:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m., and I think they should have the same chance to attend the hearings as everyone else.

MR. GROBE: John, I really appreciate you bringing that to our attention.

MR. PAPCUN: Thank you.

MR. GROBE: And we'll look into that.

MR. PAPCUN: Thank you very much.

MR. GROBE: Just as part of our -- so everyone knows, as part of our effort to ensure that we receive input from all perspectives and are keeping everybody informed of what's going on, we meet regularly with the County officials, Jere Witt, the County Administrator, as well as the three County

Board members, and at least monthly, we meet with those folks to get input from them as well as to provide them the status of what's going on from our perspective. We meet on a regular basis with the State of Ohio, Federal elected officials; Senator Voinovich and representatives from Dennis Kucinich's office, so we're trying as best we can to keep folks informed, and collect feedback, so we appreciate all the feedback.

Is there anybody else that has a question or comment?

MR. PURK: Yeah, I have one. My name is Ron Purk, and I'm a Reactor Operator at Davis-Besse, and, like some of our visitors here tonight, I live in Ottawa County. I live just outside Oak Harbor. I have a wife and kids that live there, and I wouldn't have them living in a place I didn't believe was safe.

You know, we've been working our tails off for the last year and a half trying to get the plant back on-line, and we're tired, we want to get this behind us and move forward. That's all.

MS. LIPA: Thanks, Ron.

MR. GROBE: Thanks, Ron.

THEREUPON, the audience applauded.

MR. GROBE: As I've said on prior occasions, I have a great deal of respect for anybody who comes here and is willing to stand up in front of all these people and share their opinion, and I think you're all here to talk to us, to provide comments to us, to ask us questions, and I'd appreciate if we keep the comments and questions in that context. Yes, sir.

MR. KORAS: My name is Joseph Koras. I'm a resident of Vermilion, I used to live at Cedar Point Roadway. I'm a boater on Lake Erie, probably spend more time in front of Port Clinton and Put-in-Bay and Kelleys than half the population of this state who even live locally.

I sat through this afternoon's session, and I sat through a session, I think it was in March. In my background, I ran manufacturing plants of some significant size, and it seems to me every time there was a serious problem in any of the plants everybody would jump on everything in sight and try to fix things that were considered to be okay for a long period of time. I'm sensing the same thing here and the way that if -- if the football size hole was not discovered and the original reason why the plant was told to shut down was allowed to, let's say it didn't

have whatever it was it was supposed to have when it shut down and it was allowed to get back on-line, then all of these other issues, in my opinion, of the pumps and this -- quality systems and the breakers that are tripping and all of those issues that have come up as a direct result of not being allowed to come up on-line because of this football size hole may or may not have been discovered. Certainly, there wouldn't have been a shutdown event, and they certainly wouldn't have gotten the attention that they're getting right now.

Now, on a statistical basis and having there be 103 reactors in the United States, some of which -- some of whom are approaching the end of their design life, I would have to say that there's a very high probability and I would have a very high confidence level, I did the statistics on it, to say that these similar problems that everybody is so concerned about right now exist in these other plants, and the only reason they have not been discovered is because there wasn't a catastrophic event to focus attention on it.

In your deliberations at the NRC, I would hope that that reality is dawning on somebody, and that a bigger net goes out for the other remaining

102 plants that, again, are within what, 15 years of their design life so that we don't experience this kind of an event.

I was a host family for children of Chernobyl, my wife and I, and it's not a pretty sight to see these kids come over with boils on their body. They are here for six weeks, and we do the best we can to medicate them, and we send them back home to live off of radiated ground. To me, this isn't a defective tire that you put out and one guy has an accident and everybody gets excited. This is not a reversible event. If you contaminate the environment, the soil, it's certainly beyond our lifetimes that will be contaminated and probably -- I don't know what the half life is, I used to know, but I don't anymore, but it's going to be a long time before things get remedied, and, so, in your deliberations, remember we got one shot to make this right or to prevent the one shot from making this very wrong.

MR. GROBE: You've made some excellent points, and I think I would like to try to eliminate a couple areas, and if others want to add on again, that would be great, but let me just -- you've very correctly identified that nuclear power

is a high hazard business and as are many other industries, particularly chemical industries and things of that nature. When you have a high hazard business, we want to make sure that you have appropriate margins to safety, and that is the watchword of how our regulatory framework is set up. For anything that deals with safety there's two of them, and usually they're different, so if you need the ability to put some water from this tank into that tank to make sure the plant is safe, there is usually two different kinds of pumps that are available to do that, they have independent power supplies. Oftentimes, the valves in one system could be supplied by AC power to valves and the other section system will be DC power, it's that redundancy and diversity in the design of all the safety aspects of the plant that we bank upon to make sure that this plant is always safe and there is a whole series of regulations to make sure that that equipment is always available.

One of the things you addressed has to do with what we call the maintenance rule. We approach equipment reliability from the standpoint of making sure it's reliable, and if it ever becomes unreliable the action is taken to restore its reliability.

This equipment is tested all the time, and occasionally it's run, whatever type of safety equipment might be, and any piece of equipment that can have an impact on the safety of the plant, even if it's not a safety system, is required to be subjective to our maintenance rule. And that maintenance rule specifies that if there is what we call functional failures, that's equipment performance which would have resulted in equipment not being able to do what it's supposed to do, then those require significance response, and that's something that these folks are inspecting all the time.

You commented that some of the issues that were identified during the past 20 months may or may not have been identified in the future. My experience has been that whenever an organization gets to the point where they cause the kind of problem that occurred at Davis-Besse, that what you find once you start peeling away the layers of the onion is that there are many other problems that were caused by the same symptoms, the same organizational dysfunction that resulted in the hole in the head, and that's what FirstEnergy has been about for the last 20 months, is finding all those other issues

that were caused by the same problems and fixing them, and, in fact, they were there, in fact, some were low risk significant.

As Christine mentioned earlier tonight, we issued a final significance determination on a finding regarding unqualified codings inside one of the buildings of the plant that could have caused safety systems not to operate properly, and that was at our second highest significance level, so there were a number of issues to be identified at Davis-Besse, and that's why the shutdown has taken the time it needed to take.

One of the purposes of the 0350 panel is to ensure that there is no -- for lack of a better phrase, piling on. We have a Restart Checklist that clearly identifies those issues that need to be addressed before restart. Those issues were directly tied to what caused the fairly significant -- risk significant reduction and margins to safety at Davis-Besse. There was no event at Davis-Besse, there was no accident, but there was a significant reduction in the margin to safety.

You talked about other nuclear plants. All nuclear plants in the United States are subject to the maintenance rules and are inspected to make sure

the equipment is maintained properly, and the routine -- other maintenance is done, other recommended maintenance is accomplished such that the equipment performs at the appropriate reliability level, so that's already incorporated into our regulatory framework. Most of the issues that were identified at Davis-Besse had little to do with reliability of the equipment. It had to do with the -- what I would refer to as the latent issues that you can't observe on a day-to-day basis. They were primarily design issues. They either have been introduced at the time of original construction or more likely introduced over the years because of insufficient attention and errors made in design activities, so I think I've covered the majority of your comments. Are there other topics or comments?

MR. RULAND: I have just a few additional comments. I'd just like to reiterate which I think has already been mentioned here this evening, that Davis-Besse found this problem because they were responding to an action that the NRC had requested for the licensees to go ahead and inspect the reactor vessel heads, albeit, we caught it. They found it far too late for our comfort, and that particular action was being performed by other

licensees of similar design.

In addition, as we continue to explore and probe this issue, the NRC issued additional bulletin -- an additional bulletin, and, finally, from those actions, because we were uncomfortable with just making it a bulletin, we confirmed those actions by order making these a requirement, and now the NRC is proceeding with rule making to ensure that these requirements finally are codified in Federal regulations.

In addition, you alluded to this notion that the plant was within 15 years of its design life. As you might be aware, some plants, not Davis-Besse, as I understand it, are asking for license renewal, and as part of that license renewal process, the NRC makes sure that any age related degradation, which I might add, a particular issue we're facing with the head corrosion was not directly related to age related degradation, but that age related degradation is addressed in either licensee's current programs, or if it's not addressed that they establish new programs to monitor and correct age related degradation, so the message I'm trying to send here is that the NRC in thinking about, as the plant's age are -- we hope we're anticipating that, and we

continue to monitor licensee performance through ongoing inspections, and those inspections will continue through licensee -- through a reactor's current license life, and if those plants continue to operate into a license renewal period, we'll continue to do that.

And, finally, I'd like to add about what Davis-Besse has discovered as a result of their extensive condition effort where they found a number of different problems, I believe that the 0350 panel was instrumental in making sure that the scope of activities was not directly related to just the corrosion on top of the head. Because the problems that caused the corrosion ultimately was a safety culture issue, we believe that safety culture could result in problems elsewhere, so we pursued that issue, and I think where we stand today, frankly, is, I believe is testament to our aggressive oversight and we will continue to be aggressive, as I think someone heard us poke and probe the licensee tonight about some of the statements that we're making. We'll continue to be aggressive in making sure that this plant meets our requirements and is going to be safe to operate. Otherwise, they're not getting my vote, so I think -- hopefully, I've listed a number

of things that I think are germane to the kinds of issues that you've raised, and we're going to keep after them.

MR. GROBE: Thanks, Bill. Other questions or comments? Yes, sir.

MR. COLLINS: I bet you never expected this.

MR. GROBE: No.

MR. COLLINS: Sam Collins, from the NRC, I probably ought to turn around, but I'll make my comments generally. There are three topics, and I won't comment on Davis-Besse, but there were three topics of interest which I would like to comment on. One of those is emergency preparedness, because I think John talked, and Sandy and the one lady talked about emergency preparedness, and I think it's important that that concept be appreciated. Evacuation is always a hard button with emergency preparedness, and what I would like to explain is that there's two roles of emergency preparedness. There is an on site role, which the NRC has responsibility for the licensee's actions including response to the event technically as well as any leads on items as far as assessing the significance of a release and preplanning for should any offsite

actions be necessary.

The offsite actions are done in coordination with the State and local communities, and I'd like to commend John and the volunteers in the local area for their efforts in emergency preparedness because it can't be done without the State and local officials, many of those volunteers, and that offsite response is a spectrum of actions. Evacuation is probably the one that is least likely to be used. It's important to note that the whole spectrum of activities includes no action at all other than acknowledging that there is an event going on at the site which is the most common perhaps and the alert notification as far as the classification of events as well as any type of pre-emptive action which may be sheltering in a limited sector of the 10 miles EPZ if there is an evacuation -- if there is a plume of radioactive -- in the unlikely event that is an event, that's significant all the way to the 50 mile zone, which includes protection of food and posting of feed and nondairy product consumption and those types of things, so although evacuation is focused on and it may be one of the more difficult ones to plan, it is part of the least likely to be used, but it is used, and it's typically used in nonreactor types of

events. Given the spectrum of 103 operating units of 104 that are licensed it is not uncommon for these evacuation plans to be used for not only natural disasters, but other significant industrial events such as chemical plants. The Waterford plant down in Louisiana typically uses the evacuation plan for perpetual industry and ammonia industry that's up and down the Mississippi River. Hurricanes on the coast are another example.

Three Mile Island was mentioned, significant event, and I commend you as others for coming up and talking about that. There are lessons learned from Three Mile Island, just like there are lessons learned from Davis-Besse. The lessons learned from Three Mile Island were actually implemented as orders to reactor plans to essentially change the design of the plants and these two plants are similar; change the design of the plants, and those were incorporated into the design of the plant, they are imposed by orders, and the tech specs were with us, so to that, and, yes, Three Mile Island is being taken into consideration.

Chernobyl was mentioned, and I think that's an important issue. I think Joseph mentioned Chernobyl. It's important to note that Chernobyl

design did not have any containment, and it's a very, very different design than the UN reactors, including the use of graphite, which burns very well, and I commend you for hosting, your involvement with the children. I also had the opportunity to be involved in that, and what's significant to note about emergency preparedness is the affect on the generations there is predominately because the food and the agricultural products were not prevented from being consumed for a significant amount of time by the people who live in the area of that plant that had the disaster and no containment. We have containment. We have an emergency plan, and it goes 50 miles out, and in the unlikely event there were radioaction to be released, all the food, particularly milk and dairy products, and feed for the cattle, part of the emergency preparedness plan encompasses that, so I'm not diminishing their concerns and my intent is not to downplay anyone's vested interest in those issues, but I do want to make sure the information is out there for you, and I'll be glad to talk about any of those after the meeting, so if you're interested.

Thank you very much for the comments and for the opportunity to address those, thanks.

MR. GROBE: Thanks, Sam. Any other questions or comments? Anybody else who wants to help us out, come on up to the microphone.

MR. LEWIS: Art Lewis, Shift Manager at Davis-Besse. I didn't want to be a target coming up here. Mistakes have been made at Davis-Besse. I can't pretend as an operator that I can explain them, because I can't, but I can guarantee everybody in this room being licensed 22 years, health and safety of the public has been at the forefront of my operating facility.

I asked the shift that I supervise to come here and represent Operations. If you consider their professionalism, there's three of them here that also could have become targets. I appreciate them.

Since I stated that the health and safety of public has been No. 1, I can guarantee you, you have my promise that will always be there, and that's all I can say.

MR. GROBE: Thanks, Art.

THEREUPON, the audience applauded.

MS. LIPA: Anybody else have any comments or questions?

MR. JOHNSON: First of all, this is

completely out of character for me, I usually don't say anything to anybody. My name is Tim Johnson. I have been an Operator for four years. I grew up in this community. I used to climb the tree in my Mom and Dad's woods and look at the cooling tower, never dreaming that I would ever work there. I did my time in the service, I come back to this community. I have four beautiful children that in no way would I ever put in harm. I work with a bunch of guys that for the last 19 months have gone to bed -- I know I have. We haven't been in the news until there was a mistake, and we have apologized for that, but it's like almost every night we're being torn apart, feeling like we're being slapped in the face before we go to bed. You get up in the morning, you come back to work. We have put our heart and soul into getting this place back up and running and put it back on top. I don't know what else to tell you.

Art Lewis is my Shift Manager. I have never once hesitated to take a concern to him, and as far as the other shift managers, I feel the same. If there is a problem, I stop, I go back, and I talk to them about it because it is very important. I understand that there is people here that are

concerned, and they have that right, but all I can tell you is the guys that I work with put their heart and soul into doing this right, and we just want to do what is best. Thank you.

THEREUPON, the audience applauded.

MR. GROBE: Thanks, Tim.

MS. BUCHANAN: Can I ask a second question, is that allowed?

MR. GROBE: Sure.

MS. LIPA: You'll be next after this gentleman.

MR. JOHNSON: My name is Mike Johnson. I am an Equipment Operator at Davis-Besse. It is my job to safely operate the support equipment for the reactor. I am the eyes and ears of the Reactor Operators out in the plant. I use the procedures every day. When I find a problem, I take it to my shift manager. My family lives here, my parents live here, my wife's parents live here. If there was an event where I was directed by my shift management to put my safety at jeopardy, I would do so for the public's safety, and that's my job.

MR. GROBE: Thanks, Mike.

THEREUPON, the audience applauded.

MS. LIPA: Okay, go ahead, come

on up.

MS. BUCHANAN: This, I guess, is a question having more to do with the context of how NRC makes decisions, and I have not been involved in one of these before, so I truly don't know how some of this works, but back in 2001 when FirstEnergy asked to allow the plant to be open longer rather than shutting down and the staff over -- Mr. Collins and others overruled the shutdown order and allowed the plant to stay open until February, there's been a great deal of documentation of FirstEnergy saying that their financial needs meant that they needed to keep the plant open longer. If anything, FirstEnergy is in a much tougher financial position now than it was at that time. They spent half a billion on Davis-Besse. They've had to restate their earnings, their -- you know, bond ratings have been lowered, and I would like to know in the decision making how you consider the Company's financial position, whether you determined whether they would have resources to invest more if they were allowed to restart and more problems were found, how does that all play in with the NRC decision making as it has apparently in the past?

MR. GROBE: Well, let me address

half of your question. The financial aspects of the Company comes in to play in two ways. One has to do with what we call decommissioning financial assurance. The Company has to be able to continuously demonstrate there's capability to decommission the facility if they want it shut down permanently.

The second way it comes in to play is more from a performance perspective. We regulate nuclear power in the United States from what we call a performance based framework, and what that means is that while we don't regulate any financial wherewithal with the Company, we regulate every aspect of the safety performance of the Company, and if there wasn't sufficient financial support for routine maintenance activities and testing activities and appropriate modifications that may be necessary over the years, then that would show up in the performance of the equipment, so our focus is licensing plants with appropriate safety margins and the redundancy of the duality of all safety functions, as I described earlier tonight, and then making sure that those safety margins are maintained throughout the life of the plant through our routine inspection process, and, again, the issue that

happened at Davis-Besse had to do with safety margins, diminishment of safety margins. I think I've answered the financial aspect of the question.

The decision and, I don't know if others may want to comment on this, I wasn't involved in the decision on when Davis-Besse would or wouldn't shut down; however, that decision was clearly documented as having sound technical basis. The technical basis that was the foundation for that decision was borne out when the inspections occurred, and that primarily focused on the nature and the length of cracks that could exist in the penetrations and whether those represented an immediate safety concern such that the plant needed to shut down in six weeks or six weeks later ~~or six weeks later~~. In fact, the technical analyses that were done, again, were borne out by the physical inspections of the penetrations that occurred. The corrosion of the reactor head that occurred at Davis-Besse was not anticipated and not factored into that decision. It was not known by anyone that that corrosion existed. As a matter of fact, FirstEnergy assured us, the NRC, that the head had been adequately inspected and there was no corrosion, there was no boric acid buildup on the head. The -- so the -- what really kicked off this

issue was the unexpected identification of that corrosion. That was not part of the decision that was made as to when Davis-Besse would shut down, so I think I have tried to answer your questions.

Are there any other comments, questions?

MR. RULAND: Let me just add one thing about the 0350 panel's decision about restart. We have not discussed, nor are we interested in FENOC's financial position at Davis-Besse. It has not been a subject of the panel's discussion and won't be, so it is really not a factor in how we decide or whether we decide, whether we recommend to our management whether the plant should restart. It's just not considered.

MR. GROBE: Yeah, thanks, Bill.

MR. COLLINS: (Indicating).

MR. GROBE: Sam?

MR. COLLINS: I hate to go through this again, but there's an interesting part about overriding the order, and that is I would have signed the order, so the issue is, I didn't override the order that I would have signed to issue it, and that -- it just didn't happen that way.

MS. BUCHANAN: I apologize if I misspoke. The issue is, the plant was not shut down

and the Inspector General's report went into reasons why that happened.

MR. COLLINS: It did, but your statement is inaccurate, so I just wanted to correct that for the record. Thank you.

MR. GROBE: Thanks, Sam. Yes, ma'am.

MS. CABRAL: I just wanted to tell everyone here that we have great respect for all the work the NRC is doing and all the hard work that FirstEnergy people are doing, and after the tornado we were all there to cheer when FirstEnergy showed up to put Port Clinton back together and have power again, but all this hard work can be undermined by the negligence of a few. What comes back to haunt me is the slide that you showed here of the piles of boric acid residue. There was a picture there of all that residue. Somebody had that picture, and it didn't -- they didn't like run down the hall and say, we've got to stop what we're doing and find out what this is. I don't know how anybody could look at a picture like that and not have a traumatic reaction, so all these people are concerned about their families. We're concerned about our families. We don't have a second chance if something goes

belly-up, so I don't know, you know, I mean, safety culture is a big thing. I would rather the biggest problem be a mechanical one. You can do tests on mechanical things, but you can't necessarily -- I mean, you can try as hard as you can on psychological things and on safety culture, but who do you get to be in that plant -- and I know you rotate people out, but how do you keep that picture in your mind of the disaster that can happen, you know, whether it's -- it just -- that's our concern, and it's not that we slight anybody's efforts or anybody's desire to keep their families fed, but it's -- there's such a dramatic problem if something does go wrong, so how are -- you know, how do you keep everybody, you know, focused on that because day after day everything is fine, year after year, everything is fine.

MR. GROBE: Yeah, it's -- I think you're asking the question of the NRC staff, or are you asking it of the utility staff or both?

MS. CABRAL: Really, both, but, I mean, it's kind of your dog, you know, to bite the tail there and keep it hopping.

MR. GROBE: I was just thinking of some funny canine jokes, and I probably shouldn't do that.

You're right, one of the things that we do to ensure that Resident Inspectors, for example, maintain what we call objectivity is there's several things that we do. First off, they're visited regularly by their boss, and at least every three months every Senator in the United States -- they're evaluated on an annual basis, they're rotated plant to plant, no longer than seven years in Region III, it's usually shorter than that because people move around. We have -- each of the residents has another site that they have to go and inspect a couple weeks a year, and that serves two purposes. That gives them a different perspective as well as gives them a different perspective on what the resident staff at other sites has to do.

In addition, we have in Region III about 65 inspectors in the regional office, and their job is to travel to all the sites they have. They have technical sites and capabilities that are not necessarily characteristic of a resident responsibility, but they might be emergency planning experts or security experts, or metallurgists or engineers that go around and look at those specific issues at every plant, and that provides balance and perspective.

In addition, we regularly bring the -- all the senior residents and residents into the regional office. That meeting occurs twice a year for a week to address exactly what you're saying, to learn lessons, to green baseline perspectives, to train and interact with others to learn from each other as well as learn from industry experiences.

One of the aspects we talked about earlier was the Lessons Learned Task Force, and the Lessons Learned Task Force had a lot of comments for us in this area. It addressed a broad number of topics as well as how we relate to our International counterparts, how we do research, how we do activities. We call them generic activities that address issues that could affect more than one plant, but it also addressed a number of topics. Most of that stuff happens at headquarters, and that's done in the Washington area.

It also addressed a number of issues regarding inspection, and so a whole series of initiatives and improvement activities that we undertake to enhance that inspection, so from the NRC perspective there's a number of things we try to do to ensure that we have the right stuff.

The utility has a similarly equal challenge.

As we maintain a robust safety focus -- and we've had many dialogues here about the types of things that they have undertaken. It's our job to do exactly what you said, and hopefully you'll have an opportunity to watch us do it in a very public forum, and you will gain some confidence in our ability and our commitment in doing it right.

MS. CABRAL: Thank you.

MR. RULAND: If I could -- if I could just add a few thoughts to this. When I first saw those pictures, I think I had the same visual reaction as you did, and as I think many -- I would argue virtually every NRC staff person that seen those pictures had that same visual reaction, how could this happen. I think we all took that very personally. I still take that very personally, and it's almost, you know, almost -- what could I have done, and I think that visual reaction, we sometimes call these in the NRC significant emotional events. We don't have an acronym, by the way, for that, and it affects you, though, in kind of a nonscientific way, I think, and my belief is that that's going to help us. That, you know, we're -- we, the NRC, is not going to let this happen again. That's the way I feel about it. I think that's the way my

colleagues feel about it, and my hope is that that's the way FENOC feels about it, and I think that's to me, while we pick apart what their plans are, I take that as a touch stone and a matter of pride, we shouldn't let this happen again, because, in a way, we not only let you down, you know, the people that live here in a way we let down. It's just a very personal thing, so I don't know if that helps.

MS. CABRAL: I'm really glad to hear that because my feeling is I'd almost like -- want you to have that in a training film, like the driver's ed training films, so somewhere in the back of your mind is that, you know, these things are real.

MR. RULAND: Oh, it has stuck with us.

MS. CABRAL: I'm glad it has.

MR. GROBE: I don't think it's quite like driver's ed, but the Lessons Learned Task Force has gone to one of the semiannual gatherings, where all the various regional base inspectors come together in each of the regional offices, and present the results of what happened at Davis-Besse and what they identified and what actions can be taken to improve, so that's been part of our improvement

issues.

I fully recognize, and I empathize with your concerns, you pay us to do our job, and it is our responsibility, and I'm sure FirstEnergy does their job, and if I were you I would want to have confidence that the NRC is doing their job well, and, as I stated, I hope you have the opportunity to engage in these meetings, and I hope you develop some trust and confidence in us.

MR. THOMAS: Yes, I just wanted to make one more comment on behalf of the resident staff. If you have further interests on what we do on a day-to-day basis, we put out a report about every six to seven weeks, 30, 40 page report, publicly available on the web site. Please, look forward to those reports if you have an interest in what we do on a day-to-day basis.

MR. GROBE: And if you don't have access to a computer, you can certainly -- in the monthly newsletter, on the back is Vika's home phone -- no, no, her office phone, and she'd be glad to get you anything you need.

MS. CABRAL: Thank you.

THEREUPON, the Reporter asked for a brief pause.

MR. GROBE: Okay, you're going to need a couple pads of paper for this.

(Laughter).

MR. MYERS: You made me stand up here and forget what I was going to say.

MR. GROBE: (Indicating).

MR. MYERS: I thought I'd take a moment to answer some of the questions that were really asked of FirstEnergy, so --

MR. GROBE: Why don't you introduce yourself?

MR. MYERS: My name is Lew. I'm Lew Myers. I'm the Chief Operating Officer at FirstEnergy.

There was a comment made awhile ago about FirstEnergy and the -- and the financial wherewithal and their ability to run these plants. You know, we run two other plants. We run the Beaver Valley plant, and when we bought that plant, I was Vice President over there. The performance wasn't as good. Today we're, you know, we're a fairly good performing plant. Doing good at it. A lot of people from the Beaver Valley plant are working over here. We run our Perry plant. I was the Vice President there before I went to Beaver Valley. I

have been in nuclear power now since I was 17 years old. I started at $4.16 cents an hour, and I remember it well. If I didn't believe in what I was doing, I wouldn't be here.

FirstEnergy, from a Company standpoint, started with Pete Berg. When we -- when we got into this issue, he asked me to come over here to deal with the return to service of the plant, so I took that on, bought a condo here on the Island, moved my wife over here out of our home, and we have been living out of suitcases now for a couple of years, and, in that entire time, I have never asked for anything from FirstEnergy that they haven't given me.

You know, I wanted to install the FLUS system in our plant, a lot of people questioned if that was crazy or not, and we spent millions of dollars doing that, and I'm really excited about it. I don't know how reliable the technology is, but we've got it started, so a lot is installing humidity detectors over the invested, but you could do it for $25. Well, normally, humidity detectors don't like 500 degrees, you know? $25 detectors don't take 500 degrees, and that's about what the temperature is that we're looking at there, so -- so we had to find the products that were reliable, so I went to every

vendor that I could and finally found this technology in France that would install through Framatome, so in the last 20 months, you know, we put the building blocks together to address all of the issues, and we started out with a budget, and things to get the plant on-line when I got here by repairing of the head and we spent like 45 million dollars buying a new head and cutting a hole in our containment, and we put the FLUS monitoring system in, we put the cavity seals in, you know, and I don't want to tell you how much money we spent, we spent a lot.

UNIDENTIFIED: 500 million.

MR. MYERS: That's including lost power, and I have not asked for anything that FirstEnergy hasn't supplied me, and our CEO, he comes to the plant, he calls me about once every week or two and asks me how things are going. He's trying to run our Company, which covers from the Detroit area all the way over to New Jersey. It's a fairly large Company, and, yet, he takes the time to visit this plant two or three times and he calls me once every week or two just to make sure that I've got everything that I need, you know, I can't ask for any more than that.

From a -- the other question, how could this

happen? Well, you know, it's not the NRC being blamed. I think we did a pretty good root cause. The root cause was a management issue. Our plants, we really didn't have a corporate organization, FirstEnergy just started running nuclear plants about three years ago. By then Davis-Besse was owned by Toledo Edison. Perry was owned by Cleveland Electric and then we wound up getting Beaver Valley. We didn't have any corporate organization, so each one of the plants were run by itself. That's been changed now. We have a corporate organization, that's where I'll be working out of. My job is real simple, to make sure we do things the same at all three of our plants. We have another organization that sets our standards now, and we make sure we got the same processes being implemented in our plants, and we took your oversight organization, which is a quality assurance team, to the plant and they all report to corporate so we can make sure this doesn't happen again. Let me tell you what's wrong. I can tell you exactly what was wrong. I was the VP at another nuclear plant, and we did head inspections, too. You know how I know that the head was okay? Because I looked. It was really simple. You know how I knew about the breaker problems the other

night? Because at 2:00 in the morning me and the site VP were in here watching the cycle breakers. You know, that's what it takes. You got to go look, and you got to make sure your employees look and you got to make sure you're involved with all the issues every day. If you don't have the energy to do that, then you better find something else to do. That's what it takes to have the right safety culture and standards. If you lose the sight of management team, sight of leadership team, are not involved in looking at the videotapes and understanding what you got on the head, then you failed on that, then you failed as the management team, and you let the organization down. You got to -- you got to know because you got to go look. You just got to go look, and there's issues there. There's people reporting that there's more on the head. You need to get your people in containment and see what you got, and be ready to explain it. You got to put your control issues together and be the best expertise you possibly can, and just like you go to a doctor and say, what's causing this every time. That's what we did on the breaker issues the other night. We went and got the vendor. 2:00 in the morning we're on the phone with the vendors finding out that this has been

an issue before, and you find out because you go look, and you won't be good at everything you do, but you've got to go look, and that's the standards the management has to set. Thank you.

THEREUPON, the audience applauded.

MR. GROBE: Any other questions or comments?

MS. LIPA: Okay, well, while somebody who might have a question is thinking, let me just give a couple of things from the questions we've got tonight, I took a couple of actions and those actions -- am I on?

UNIDENTIFIED: No.

MS. LIPA: Okay, so from the comments and questions that we got tonight, I took a few actions, one that we already mentioned was to respond to the letters, and there's another box of them.

The other one was to look at the November 4th meeting, see if we could reschedule that, and we'll get right on that right away, and also there was a letter from the Kelleys Island group that we will read.

MR. GROBE: One other, some photographs for Jim Caldwell.

MS. LIPA: Yes, some photographs for Jim Caldwell.

MR. DUNN: Letters to Jim Caldwell as well.

MR. GROBE: Yes, she already said letter to Caldwell.

MS. LIPA: Right, and I got the letters. Yes. Okay, so -- is there anybody else who has any comments or questions for us?

(NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE).

MS. LIPA: Okay, so we'll -- the November 4th meeting, we'll look to reschedule that and keep everybody posted on our web site. Thank you for coming. Good night.

THEREUPON, the meeting was adjourned.

CERTIFICATE

STATE OF OHIO)
) ss.
COUNTY OF HURON)

I, Marlene S. Lewis, Stenotype Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State aforesaid, duly commissioned and qualified, do hereby certify that the foregoing, consisting of 88 pages, was taken by me in stenotype and was reduced to writing by me by means of Computer-Aided Transcription; that the foregoing is a true and complete transcript of the proceedings held in that room on the 7th day of October, 2003 before the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I also further certify that I was present in the room during all of the proceedings.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal of office at Wakeman, Ohio this day of , 2003.

Marlene S. Lewis
Notary Public
3922 Court Road
Wakeman, OH 44889

My commission expires 4/29/04